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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE ETHICS OF REPRESENTING CLIENTS WITH LIMITED
COMPETENCY IN GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS
HENRY DLUGACZ* AND CHRISTOPHER WIMMER**
I. INTRODUCTION
A substantial body of literature has cropped up in the past twenty years
addressing the role of and practical and ethical challenges facing attorneys
representing individuals with mental disabilities,1 both in general practice
and in proceedings (such as competency determinations in criminal cases
and civil commitments) where mental disability is the central issue.2 Some of
this literature overlaps with the larger body of literature from the past few
decades on “client-centered” lawyering.3 Though we are indebted to these
resources, few articles have addressed at length the specific ethical

* M.S.W, J.D., Beldock, Levine & Hoffman, LLP, New York Medical College, New York Law
School.
** J.D., Brune and Richard LLP.
1. In this article, we use the term “mental disability” broadly to refer to a range of
intellectual disabilities such as schizophrenia that are often characterized as “illnesses,” to
progressive syndromes such as dementia that often accompany old age, and to
developmental disabilities that remain relatively constant over life. When we discuss “mental
illness” specifically, we are primarily referring to mental illnesses thought of as serious and
persistent, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or schizoaffective disorders which are often
amenable to treatment and will typically have a fluctuating course of time.
2. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of
Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1993) [hereinafter Perlin, Pretexts]; Jan Ellen Rein,
Ethics and the Questionably Competent Client: What the Model Rules Say & Don’t Say, 9
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 241 (1988); Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again):

Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157 (2010).
3. For early examples of this work, see, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977); Richard Wasserstrom,
Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 4-6 (1975); Marcy Strauss,
Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65
N.C. L. REV. 315 (1986-1987). For more recent works, see, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL B.
BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed.
2004); Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006).
331
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challenges facing an attorney representing a person with limited competency
who is the subject of a guardianship4 petition.
The attorney representing a client with limited competency works in an
ethical minefield.
The paramount value guiding the attorney-client
representation is client autonomy – the exercise of self-determination. Yet
the client with limited competency, by definition, has some degree of
difficulty making the decisions that constitute self-determination. The
attorney representing such a client must determine how best to vindicate
client autonomy in the long term without unduly compromising it in the short
term.
These questions are particularly nettlesome for the attorney
representing a client who is the subject of a guardianship petition because
he must simultaneously protect the information he has concerning the
client’s condition in order to preserve the ability to contest the petition,
zealously represent the client’s interests, and ensure that the client’s longterm autonomy is not being sacrificed in the name of “beating” the petition.5
The spectrum of limitations experienced by clients and the unique demands
of each representation make categorical answers impossible and attorney
judgments inevitable. Our goal throughout this article is to offer a practical
framework, and some concrete suggestions, for attorneys operating in an
ethically muddy area. Where we are unable to do this, we hope to at least
frame the question clearly so that debate concerning an insufficiently
discussed topic can be generated.
Part II of this article describes the case of a representative hypothetical
client facing a guardianship petition. Part III sets out the normative
framework of our approach to client representation. Part IV discusses the
ethical challenges facing the attorney representing a client with a mental
disability. Part V provides some context about guardianship proceedings
and applies the issues discussed in earlier sections to those proceedings.
Part VI considers a scattering of related issues.
II. A HYPOTHETICAL: MS. X
Ms. X is a 68-year-old woman living in a one-bedroom apartment in a
large metropolitan area.6 She is not married and never had children. Long

4. We use the term “guardianship,” though some states term the proceedings for the
appointment of a person to supervise the affairs of a person with severe mental disabilities a
“conservatorship.” See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1800-04 (West 2002).
5. Unless, of course, the client makes an informed decision to do this and has the
capacity to understand the consequences.
6. This hypothetical is a hybrid drawn from one of the author’s (HD) experiences in
hundreds of legal proceedings involving people with mental disabilities as well as otherwise
working with individuals with mental illness in various capacities. Another hypothetical, and
an effective attempt to work through some of these issues, was presented at the May 2003
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ago, she lost track of a half-brother, her mother’s son, and she leads an
isolated life. That brother, who is three years her junior, recently located Ms.
X on Facebook, seeking to rekindle contact, but to date, Ms. X has declined
to respond to his overture.
While in her 20s, Ms. X worked regularly as a supervisor in a factory
and achieved a Bachelor’s degree going to school at night. She was
injured in an explosion of a poorly maintained pipe and, while not
permanently disabled, she secured a rather large settlement from a personal
injury suit brought in connection with that incident. Her overall functioning
deteriorated as she stayed home recuperating, and she never returned to
full-time employment again. She also began to experience feelings of
paranoia, thinking that her phone was tapped. Her doctor mentioned
schizophrenia and prescribed Thorazine. This helped with her feelings of
paranoia, but Ms. X developed involuntary twitches from the medication.
She became increasingly self-conscious of them and continued her isolative
behavior. She has never executed a living will, health care proxy, last will
and testament, or power of attorney.
Over time, the state of Ms. X’s apartment has deteriorated, and
occasionally her electricity is cut off. Neighbors have brought this to the
attention of building management, who has involved the city’s Adult
Protective Services (“APS”). APS has considered bringing guardianship
petitions in the past but, when faced with this prospect, Ms. X has agreed to
engage in intensified psychiatric treatment and has been willing to tap into
her still adequate financial resources to restore her apartment to a more
livable state. Recently, though, she has appeared less amenable to
intervention and her treatment providers wonder if she is showing early signs
of dementia in addition to her long-standing mental illness. Ms. X has
begun to horde artifacts in her apartment – refusing, for example, to discard
old newspapers, which now are stacked halfway to the ceiling in some
portions of her apartment. Her adherence to her prescribed medication
regime has likewise become less steady as she is reluctant to leave the
apartment for appointments with her psychiatrist. Ms. X does not shop, but
orders in Chinese takeout. She does not do laundry; instead, she relies on
a service that picks up her soiled clothing and cleans it. There is concern
that she may spend all of her savings on these types of services.
APS has now moved forward with a guardianship petition seeking to
have a community agency appointed guardian of Ms. X’s person and

annual meeting of the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems, and is
available online. See Robert D. Fleischner, Selected Materials on Ethical Issues in the
Representation of People with Disabilities, CTR. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION (May 2003),
www.centerforpublicrep.org/litigation-and-major-cases/litigation-issues/78-selected-materials
-on-ethical-issues-in-the-representation-of-people-with-disabilities.
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property. You have been appointed to represent Ms. X, who is steadfastly
opposed to the guardianship petition. Her current belief is that she does not
require psychotropic medications, as she no longer believes that she suffers
from a mental disability. She correctly recites the potentially dangerous side
effects of these medications, some of which she has experienced, but also
believes that the psychiatrist might be working in conjunction with her
brother to “get their hands” on her bank account.7 She thinks that the
medication is an attempt to cloud her mind so that they may achieve this
goal. She acknowledges that her apartment is cluttered, but says that she
prefers it that way. With respect to the concern that she may burn through
her remaining money, Ms. X states the belief that it is better for her to spend
her money as she sees fit than let it fall into the hands of her brother and
psychiatrist. To further complicate matters, Ms. X., a chain smoker, has
developed a persistent cough. She so far has declined efforts by her
treatment team for an MRI, stating that she would rather not know what is
“going on inside.”
We will return to the case of Ms. X periodically in this article.
III. OUR NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
It is impossible to identify and resolve ethical issues in a reasoned way
without first setting out a normative framework. Articulating values forces
the writer to identify his commitments and motivations, and makes it possible
to test actions against stated values and identify which values are being
given primacy and which are being sacrificed. At the same time, a
theoretical framework cannot resolve practical real-world problems on its
own. One can agree with the thesis we set out below and still come to
completely different conclusions about how to handle any dilemma in actual
practice. What can be achieved is a sensitizing of the ethical compass: By
considering the values at stake, and how various practical solutions do or
do not serve those values, we become better judges of the options available
to us when presented with actual clients and their desires and constraints.
With that caveat, our normative thesis is this: (1) Autonomy is the
paramount value in client representation. (2) Whenever the attorney
believes the client is competent, the attorney should respect her choice.8 (3)
Whenever the attorney believes the client’s competency is limited, the
attorney should intrude on the client’s autonomy in the short term only to the
extent necessary to achieve ends that facilitate the client’s autonomy in the
7. For a recent, vivid portrayal of the complications created by an individual with some
mental illness who resists treatment, see Rachel Aviv, God Knows Where I Am: A Patient
Rejects Her Diagnosis, THE NEW YORKER, May 30, 2011, at 57.
8. For sake of clarity, we have arbitrarily used masculine pronouns to refer to the
attorney and feminine pronouns to refer to the client.
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long term. (4) All of this should be undertaken with a healthy dose of selfdoubt. We attempt to unpack, justify, and qualify this thesis below.
(1) Autonomy is the paramount value in client representation.
We, as most others who have considered the issue, believe that there
are two overarching values governing the lawyer-client relationship. The
first is client autonomy. The client, as any other human actor, is entitled to
the unrestrained exercise of her will whenever it does not harm others.9 In
this regard, the attorney’s role is to apply his specialized skills to realize the
client’s goals. The second principle is beneficence. The attorney, as a
professional with privileged status and significant powers of action and
persuasion, is obligated to act in a way that benefits the client.10 To that
extent, the attorney’s role is to apply his specialized skills to better the
client’s situation or prevent it from deteriorating.
It is not difficult to see how these principles can and do come into
conflict in both theory and practice. First, they focus on two separate actors.
Autonomy begins from the perspective of the client; beneficence begins from
the perspective of the attorney. This sets up an inevitable conflict based on
the subjectivity of experience and the different goals and motivations of the
actors. Second, even from the attorney’s perspective, the two values require
the attorney to evaluate two different metrics to see whether the
representation has “succeeded.” To evaluate whether he has served client
autonomy, the attorney must look to his conduct in the course of the
representation and his interactions with the client: Did the client understand
that she was in control of the representation and was she permitted to
exercise that control within the wide bounds given to her?11 To evaluate
whether he has served beneficence, the attorney looks to whether he
achieved a “good” result for the client: Is she better off than she was at the
beginning of the representation, or than she would have been without the
attorney’s assistance?
In our view, the value which must prevail, whenever possible, is client
autonomy. Our conclusion is based on two rationales. First, because
beneficence depends on a value judgment imposed by the attorney, it is
suspect. Even if the attorney is able to set aside the lenses of race, class,
gender, or other elements of subjectivity that color his judgments, the
judgments will still be his rather than the client’s. Since the attorney is being

9. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010).
10. Id.
11. The discretion is bound, of course, by the attorney’s ethical and moral obligations not
to assist the client in victimization of others (codified as the crime/fraud exception to attorney
duties of loyalty and confidentiality) or, in sufficiently extreme cases, in harming herself. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 1.14 (2010).
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retained by the client,12 he should act as an agent, not as a principal.
Second, in the context of the attorney-client relationship, client autonomy is
by definition the “best” result.13 The attorney is engaged not for the purpose
of guiding the client in her life decisions, but to resolve a particular problem
that has brought into play the legal system and that threatens the client’s
autonomy – to defeat an indictment, prevent eviction, secure public benefits,
or (as in the case of a guardianship petition) protect her right to be
recognized as a legally competent actor.14 Replacing the client’s judgment
with that of the attorney, even where the attorney acts with the best of
intentions, replaces one threat to autonomy with another.
This is an especially critical issue for attorneys representing marginalized
populations.15 For those attorneys working in these fields who practice
“client-centered” lawyering, the aim is to empower the client by helping her
attain her goals through the legal process, rather than further subjugating
her desires to the interests and convenience of the other parties, the legal
system, or her attorney.16 In general, this means ensuring that the client’s
objectives are pursued rather than those of the attorney, and that the
attorney does not project his values onto the client and allow that projection
to taint the representation. As Foucault observed, for most individuals, their
interactions with individual officers of government agencies are their most
tangible interactions with power.17 The courts are a branch of government,
and the attorney is an officer of the court. Even if the attorney views himself
as a “free radical” within this system, the reality is that he is an institutional
actor – a repeat player – and he will very frequently be perceived as a part
of the institution by the client.18 Thus, how attorney-client interactions play

12. This holds true even where the attorney is being paid by a state actor or some other
disinterested third party; the attorney is the client’s, rather than the payor’s agent. See infra
Part III.D.
13. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s
Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 225 (1991) (“[T]he most notable theory of ‘the good’ to come out
of the law schools in recent years defines the good in terms of the ‘choices’ people make
when not under ‘domination.’ This sounds very much like a theory of autonomous choice.”).
14. As we discuss elsewhere, see infra Part V., the client may – but may not – choose to
contest the proceeding or attempt to limit the scope of any subsequent guardianship order.
15. For a review of some of the vibrant literature in this area, see Paul R. Tremblay,
Critical Legal Ethics, 20 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 133 (2007) (reviewing Lawyers’ Ethics
and the Pursuit of Social Justice: A Critical Reader (Susan D. Carle ed., 2005)).
16. Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32
ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 507 (1990).
17. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE
COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1975-1976 (Arnold I. Davidson et al. eds., David Macey trans., Picador
1997) (2003).
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl. ¶ 1 (2010) (referring to lawyers as “officer[s]
of the legal system”).
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out is critical to the client’s assessment of her position in society, the respect
she has been accorded, and her relationship to that power. Put simply, the
person who is able to exert her will in an interaction with her attorney is
“empowered”; the person who is rebuffed is “disempowered.”19 Because
empowerment is the goal of client-centered lawyering, when in conflict,
beneficence should give way to autonomy.20
(2) Whenever the attorney believes the client is competent, the attorney
should respect her choice.
If autonomy is the paramount value, then the attorney should not allow
his views to interfere with the client’s choice when the attorney believes the
client is acting competently – that is, when the attorney believes that the
client is capable of exercising her autonomy.
Several issues need to be unpacked here. First, is the question of
competency. We have in mind here the model of competency developed in
the case law and mental health literature regarding informed consent21 and
described by the authors of the Macarthur Treatment Competence Study, a
landmark empirical study into health care decision-making by individuals
with mental illness.22 That study highlighted four decision-making abilities.23
One is the ability to understand the information provided.24 A second is the
ability to rationally manipulate the information provided (e.g., comparing

19. As we discuss infra Part IV.C.3, this notion is complicated by the reality that
“autonomy” – the right and responsibility for making one’s own decisions – may not be what
every client wants.
20. As we discuss passim below, the real-life interaction between these two values can be
exceedingly complex.
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2005). Informed consent is “the
agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated
adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available
alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” Id. (Emphasis added to underscore that
communicating with another person involves a dyadic process whereby information is
provided by one party (in this case, the attorney) and is received, clarified if necessary, and
ultimately comprehended by the other (in this case, the client).)
22. See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study. I: Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 105
(1995) [hereinafter Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competency Study. I];
Thomas Grisso et al., The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. II: Measures of Abilities
Related to Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 127 (1995); Thomas
Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III: Abilities of
Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (1995)
[hereinafter Grisso & Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III].
23. Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. I, supra note 22,
at 109-11.
24. Id. at 109-10.
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benefits and risks of various options).25 A third is the ability to appreciate
the situation and its consequences for decision-makers in the concrete,
rather than merely in the abstract.26 A fourth is the ability to communicate
choices.27 Limitations in any of these capacities interfere with client
autonomy because they hinder the client’s ability to make choices that
reflect her genuine preferences.28 Put another way, the attorney would
believe the client is competent when she is making decisions under her own
reason, and not under the influence of mistakes about facts, their
interactions, or consequences, and is unable to communicate her choices
accurately.
A second issue is what it means for the attorney to “respect” a client’s
choice – or, conversely, what it means to not “interfere” with a client’s
choice. It should not mean being a mere vessel for the client’s decisions.
Providing the client with the attorney’s subjective views is not an intrusion on
her autonomy, but rather a necessary precondition to her exercise of
autonomy in the face of legal difficulties. The attorney has superior
knowledge of the legal system, the judge, and opposing counsel, and – if
operating in a field where he has sufficient experience – possibly the
practical consequences of resolving a dispute in a particular way. Attorneys
are retained or appointed not to be ticket-takers, but to bring their expertise
and experience to bear on the problems of their clients. They also serve an
important role as an ally who can provide perspective on the facts at issue
and the arguments the client is likely to face from the other parties to the
matter. An attorney’s opinion is important to most clients, and they are
entitled to it. The “choice” that should be respected is the one that the client
makes after receiving from the attorney the information and counseling
required to understand the options available and the consequences of
choosing a specific course of action. On the other hand, as detailed
elsewhere,29 how the attorney elects to communicate his views is important.
The attorney should not overbear the client’s will by presenting his opinions
with much force or argue them as he would to a court. For example, he
may choose to communicate what he believes to be the “best” choice, but
he should identify the assumptions he has made, the reasons for his
conclusion, and the weaknesses in his approach.

25. Id. at 110-11.
26. Id. at 110.
27. Id. at 109.
28. Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. I, supra note 22,
at 109-11. We acknowledge that this assumes that there is a “healthy” viewpoint for any
individual.
29. See infra Part III.B.
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A third issue is that we have phrased this precept from the perspective of
what the “attorney believes.” This is deliberate. We are addressing how the
attorney should conduct himself. In actual practice, except in extreme cases,
the attorney will never know with certainty whether (or to what degree) one
or more of the client’s decision-making abilities is limited in some way. He
will necessarily have to depend on his perception of the client’s functioning.
This puts into play issues of subjectivity, preconceptions, and prejudice
regarding mental disability discussed elsewhere in this article,30 but there is
no avoiding it. The attorney representing a client who may have limited
competency has little choice but to make judgments about the client’s
functioning. In the specific context of guardianship petitions, there will very
frequently be some limitation on the client’s decision-making abilities; were
there not some significant deficiency in functioning, a petition would not
likely have been brought in the first place.31 Thus, the attorney will
necessarily have to make judgments about how severe those limitations are,
and whether they are interfering with the client’s rational thought, day-to-day
functioning, and ability to exercise her autonomy.32 There are bases on
which to make an informed judgment. For example, an examination of
specific areas of day-to-day functioning is useful. Can the client manage a
checking account? Is she sufficiently nourished? Does she attend medical
appointments and have the ability to follow through with treatment? But, in
the end, there is no escaping the dilemma of subjectivity and the attorney’s
limited understanding of the mind of another – there can only be awareness
of it.33

30. See infra Part III.A.
31. This is not to say that every person who is the subject of a guardianship petition ought
to be found incompetent. Quite the contrary. As we discuss elsewhere, one can have some
limitations on decision-making capacity and still be able to function very well with appropriate
supports and limited intervention. The point is that, setting aside a bad faith petition, the
person who is the subject of the petition was likely demonstrating some characteristics that led
someone in close contact with her to believe that she was unable to care for her own needs.
However, particularly where the petitioner stands to gain (economically or otherwise) from the
appointment of a guardian, the possibility of self interest on the part of the petitioner should
be considered by the attorney representing the person alleged to be incapacitated. See infra
Part IV.
32. Stanley S. Herr, Representation of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and
Control, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 609, 621-23 (1989-1990).
33. For an excellent fictional treatment of this dilemma, see, e.g., PAUL AUSTER, THE NEW
YORK TRILOGY (Per Bregne ed., Green Integer 2008) (1987).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

340

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 4:331

(3) Whenever the attorney believes the client’s competency is limited, the

attorney should intrude on the client’s autonomy in the short term
only to the extent necessary to achieve ends that facilitate the client’s
autonomy in the long term.

We believe that intrusions on client autonomy are permissible when the
client is, because of mental disability or other limitation, unable to act
autonomously.34 We believe intrusion is permissible in these situations
because, if the client is limited in a material way in her ability to understand
facts, their interactions, or their consequences, or in her ability to
communicate her choices, then her ability to act autonomously is already
impaired.35 The American Bar Association’s (ABA) model rule on the topic
is consistent with this approach. Model Rule 1.14 provides that, if the
attorney reasonably believes the client is unable to act in her own best
interests and is at risk of harm as a consequence, the attorney can take what
the rule terms “protective action.”36
It is important to distinguish, however, between a situation in which the
attorney believes in a general sense that something is “not right” with the
client, but can pinpoint no deficit in decision-making, and situations in
which the client is showing difficulties with one of the four components of
decision-making. In the former situation, no intervention is warranted. This
approach is consistent with both Model Rule 1.14 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).37 Under the ABA rule, the representation should be
kept, “as far as reasonably possible, . . . normal.”38 Under the ADA,
individuals with disabilities are to be provided, whenever possible, the same
34. We do not subscribe to the school of thought that holds that all human action is
autonomous, regardless of its origin. We do believe there is such a thing as mental disability,
and that those suffering from the acute manifestations of such a disability may, over the long
run, recover, and in the short run, through treatment and support, may return to rational
thought and the conditions of autonomy. What is critical to remember, and this is recognized
by modern guardianship statutes at least in theory, is that mental disability is not synonymous
with lack of capacity.
35. Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. I, supra note 22,
at 109-11. As with the second precept, this depends on the attorney making a judgment
about the client’s competence based on his experience with her.
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.14(b) (2010). The commentary notes that such
action might include “consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to
permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decisionmaking tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups,
professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the
ability to protect the client” or seeking appointment of a guardian. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R 1.14 cmt. 5 (2010).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2010); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12102 (2008).
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2010).
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services that others receive.39 Those with a “disability” are entitled to
enjoyment of the same “services” of a “public accommodation” as those
without a disability, unless the difference in service is “necessary to provide
the individual . . . with a . . . service . . . that is as effective as that provided
to others,” and attorney’s offices are defined under the ADA as “public
accommodations.”40 As reflected in the ABA commentary and in the
Macarthur Study, a person with mental disability or illness “often has the
ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters
affecting the client’s own well-being.”41 That is, the attorney should not
intrude upon the autonomy of a client with mental disability who is not
showing deficits in decision-making simply because the client shows other
symptoms of mental disability.
We also believe that the primary permissible intrusion on client
autonomy is one that invades short-term autonomy in order to foster longterm autonomy. The attorney should not be acting for his own convenience.
For example, we would say that an attorney who unilaterally decides to rely
on a client’s family member to gain information about a client simply
because the client has become difficult to work with has acted
inappropriately. He has intruded on short-term autonomy by breaching the
duties of client confidentiality,42 client communication,43 and possibly client
loyalty,44 but is not helping to support the client to maintain long-term
autonomy.45 By contrast, we would say that an attorney who pursues a
meritorious appeal for a criminal defendant who, solely because of
manifestations of mental illness, wishes to drop the appeal, has acted
appropriately. He has intruded on the defendant’s short-term autonomy by
overriding his request to drop the appeal. However, he has kept options
open for the defendant rather than foreclosing them, and has made it less
likely that the defendant will suffer criminal punishment (including

39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65 (2008) (prohibiting discrimination by public entities,
including public transportation services); Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89 (2006) (prohibiting
discrimination by private entities in public accommodations and services). See also Salzman,
supra note 2, at 183-87.
40. RONALD M. HAGER, NAT’L DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK (NDRN), PRACTICAL ETHICS: SERVING
CLIENTS WITH LIMITED COGNITIVE ABILITY AND LIMITED COMMUNICATION ABILITY 10-11 (2009).
See also Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7)(F), 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2008).
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 1 (2010); Grisso & Appelbaum, The
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III, supra note 22, at 173.
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010).
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2010).
44. See infra Part III.D.
45. There are cases in which it may be appropriate to include family members, but this
should be with the client’s knowledge and consent and for the specific purpose of achieving
the client’s goals in the representation. See infra Part IV.C.
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incarceration, which can be especially harsh on those with mental illness),46
which is a much more serious intrusion on autonomy. Many decisions are
not so easy. As detailed below,47 determining what intrusions will foster
long-term autonomy is especially thorny in the guardianship context.
Finally, any intrusion on short-term autonomy should be the least
restrictive necessary to deal with the problems created by the client’s limited
competency. This approach is consistent with the ABA commentary to
Model Rule 1.14 and an ABA formal opinion.48 The commentary highlights
that, in taking “protective action,” the attorney should “intrud[e] into the
client’s decisionmaking autonomy to the least extent feasible . . . .”49 The
opinion similarly states that “the principle of respecting the client’s autonomy
dictates that the action taken by a lawyer who believes the client can no
longer adequately act in his or her own interest should be the action that is
reasonably viewed as the least restrictive action under the circumstances.”50
(4) All of this should be undertaken with a healthy dose of self-doubt.
A final key element of our normative framework is self-doubt. We
believe that none of us is free from misconceptions and prejudices, making
it critical that we monitor our reactions to our clients and how they may be
affecting our judgments. If we are prone to viewing those with mental illness
as helpless and disenfranchised, we may resolve ethical dilemmas too much
in favor of paternalism. If we emphasize personal responsibility, we may be
too harsh in thinking that the client’s views should conform to generally
accepted norms or that the client should be made to “learn” from her
“mistakes.” If we are excessively rights-oriented, in the sense that we believe
that all people must seek to vindicate their rights to the greatest extent
possible in all situations, we may push the client to aggressively litigate
where she might wish to settle or acquiesce.51 But a “healthy” dose of selfdoubt is not a paralyzing dose. Self-doubt does not mean handwringing. It
46. Jamie Fellner, Special Comment: A Human Rights Perspective on Segregating the
Mentally Ill, CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH REP., May/June 2009, at 1079, 1080, available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/05/18/special-comment-human-rights-perspective-segre
gating-mentally-ill; Jamie Fellner, Afterwords: A Few Reflections, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
1079, 1082 (2008); David Lovell, L. Clark Johnson, & Kevin C. Cain, Recidivism of
Supermax Prisoners in Washington State, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 633, 634-35 (2007).
47. See infra Part IV.
48. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 5 (2010). See also ABA Comm. On
Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996).
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 5 (2010).
50. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996).
51. The specific correlate in the guardianship context is that having a guardian appointed
is a relief to some people who have struggled to function daily but whose sense of pride or
lack of insight into their disabilities has thwarted their ability to accept assistance through less
intrusive means.
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means skepticism about one’s first reactions and a willingness to engage in
ongoing self monitoring.
Stating this normative framework does not resolve the many ethical
issues that can arise in the course of a representation of an individual with a
mental disability, as the balance of this article will show. We cannot resolve
individual, concrete dilemmas by reference to abstract principles. Yet it
does provide a backdrop against which to assess the conduct of the attorney
taking on such representations.
IV. ETHICAL ISSUES IN REPRESENTATIONS OF CLIENTS WITH LIMITED COMPETENCY
There are four key ethical issues that arise in the representation of any
client – (1) preservation of client authority, (2) adequate communication with
the client, (3) preservation of confidential information, and (4) avoidance of
conflicts of interest.52 Each of these is underpinned by autonomy concerns.
The key decisions are the client’s to make. To make those decisions, the
client needs to be adequately informed. To communicate the key
information to the attorney necessary for the client to be informed about the
legal consequences of the facts and her options, the client needs to know
that her information will be kept confidential. To rely on the attorney to
carry out her desires, and so trust that she is receiving accurate information
and can rely on the attorney in certain tactical areas, the client needs to
know that she has the attorney’s undivided loyalty.
Carrying out each of the four core ethical duties becomes more
complicated when dealing with a client who has limited competency
because of mental disability. The client may have a limited ability to
communicate desires and information. The client may have a limited ability
to understand information communicated by the attorney or a limited ability
to understand choices. The client may voice desires that do not appear to
be in her best interests, raising the possibility— but not proving— that she is
not acting rationally. The interests of the attorney may conflict with the
client, or the client may believe they do.
We consider each of these duties in turn, relying in the first instance on
the formulation of them in the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility53 and amplifying this with a discussion of how these duties fit
into our normative framework, and then applying them to the representation
of the client with limited competency. To return to a theme: The ABA Model

52. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl. (2010).
53. Though each jurisdiction has its own rules governing attorney practice, we focus on
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility because they are the most influential and
serve as the pattern for most states’ rules.
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Rules are permissive, and provide limited guidance in practice.54 A
normative framework, even if carefully developed, also cannot determine
the correct answer to any dilemma. The attorney must still decide how to
act on a case-by-case basis.

A. Client Authority
The attorney is the client’s agent. The representation is the client’s, and
the life affected is the client’s. In our hypothetical, it will be Ms. X, not the
attorney, who loses some of her right to self-determination if the
guardianship petition is granted – and it will be Ms. X, not the attorney, who
may continue to live in a state of continuing decline if it is denied. The
attorney ought to bring the full breadth of his knowledge, insight,
experience, and judgment to bear on the client’s issues, but the key
decisions that define the representation are the client’s to make.
The ABA has a Model Rule that deals with this issue.55 It distinguishes
between the ends of the representation – which it states are the client’s to
determine – and the means of achieving those ends – about which it states
the attorney must consult with the client.56 Model Rule 1.2 provides that “a
lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the
representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued.”57
The official commentary to the rule reiterates this basic division: The
client has “the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by
legal representation.”58 The attorney “shall consult” with the client about
strategic matters.59 The commentary acknowledges that, as a matter of
practice, “[c]lients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their
lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives,
particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters.”60 Neither
the rule nor commentary, however, provides a mechanism for determining
how to resolve conflicts over strategy, except to note that, at the outer limits,
the attorney may withdraw and the client may discharge the attorney.61
This rule requires modification to fit within our framework. Its basic
division between “ends” and “means” does not acknowledge that how an
54. Herr, supra note 32, at 620 (noting “the professional codes do not provide much aid
to effective, client-centered lawyering”). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, SCOPE ¶
14 (2010).
55. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010).
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 1 (2010).
57. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2010).
58. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 1 (2010).
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2010).
60. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2010).
61. Id.
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end is pursued may be as important to the client as achievement of the
goal, and that, for the client whose goal is not simply to vindicate her legal
rights to the maximum extent possible, there may not be a clear “means”
and “ends” distinction. For example, a client in a commercial dispute with
an important business partner may be willing to write aggressive letters and
even file a complaint to bring the dispute to a head, but may not be willing
to notice the depositions of particular witnesses because to do so would be
inflammatory. Conversely, it may be important to such a client to notice
particular depositions as quickly as possible and not grant any continuances
or extensions. In the family law or guardianship context, how arguments are
presented can have a critical impact on ongoing relationships that the client
may depend upon on a day-to-day basis. That a client has chosen to take
recourse to available legal protections in her dispute with a friend or family
member does not mean that she is prepared to (or can) sever all
connections to that person. Yet the rule directs only that the attorney
“consult” with the client on these “technical, legal and tactical” matters,
suggesting that the final decisions about these matters rest with the
attorney.62 Further, while the rule accurately notes that clients often defer to
their attorneys on these matters,63 it does not consider why that is so or
whether it is appropriate. There is also reason to question whether this
claim is accurate as a descriptive matter. Aside from the concerns described
above, most clients bearing some or all of the costs of representation will be
interested in the costs and benefits of “tactical” or “technical” decisions.
Finally, the rule also provides no guidance on how to resolve any conflicts
that may arise between the client and the attorney on “means” other than to
note that, at the outer edges, the attorney may withdraw.64
We would clarify that, as a starting point, the attorney should give the
client the opportunity to approve every significant action in a representation.
Each practice will have its own set of “significant actions,” but we would
include classic “tactical” decisions such as whether to serve discovery
requests, whether to seek depositions of any individual, and whether and
whom to call as witnesses at any hearing. This approach serves client
autonomy by ensuring that the client maintains authority over every aspect of
the representation, and by reinforcing the agent-principal nature of the
attorney-client relationship. For related reasons, it also protects the
attorney-client relationship. For example, Ms. X, who already suspects that
her brother and psychiatrist are scheming against her, may begin to suspect
her attorney, as well, if he makes decisions without her. This approach also
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. As discussed infra Part IV.C.5, withdrawal is generally an unsatisfactory solution
for both the attorney and the client.
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offers considerable benefits to the attorney. In general, clients who are
more involved with a representation are more responsive to requests for
information and answer questions more effectively. The client who is aware
of the many technical and tactical decisions that an attorney must make
during the course of the representation will better appreciate the need for
the attorney’s expertise. The client who is kept abreast of even minor
developments and who approves tactical decisions is also less likely to be
surprised by an adverse result, and so less likely to pursue or succeed on a
malpractice claim at the end of the representation.
There are a number of factors that may affect whether and how an
attorney preserves client authority when the client has limited competency.
Because attorneys, like everyone else, may harbor misconceptions
concerning people with mental disabilities,65 they may tend to discount or
ignore the opinions of clients with mental disabilities. For example, the
attorney who treasures neatness, order, and the company of others may
discount Ms. X’s claim that she prefers to live a more isolated existence
amongst piles of newspapers and other clutter. This may lead the attorney
to override, either explicitly or by excessively forceful persuasion, the view of
such a client on matters that the attorney regards as “technical, legal and
tactical,”66 or in the extreme case, override the client’s choices about end
goals. Attorneys often have a tendency to combat the “opponent” in any
representation in order to “win” for themselves or the client, and may seek
this result without regard to its impact on the client or to whether the client
shares this goal.67 When a judge has observed a client with symptoms of
limited competency, he or she may look to the attorney to act as a decisionmaker, either in the hopes of reaching a favorable result, or out of a desire
to smooth the processing of the client’s case. The client may not be used to
exercising her autonomy without interference, and so may be hesitant to
voice her opinion. The client may also be so overwhelmed by the prospect
of a negative outcome to the representation that she automatically defers to
the attorney, or actively requests that he make all decisions for her, in the

65. Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical
Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 684, 689-90 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Sanism]. Cf. WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 2011 WL 2437013, at *19 (June 20, 2011) (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting) (“Managers, like all humankind, may be prey to the biases of which they are
unaware.”).
66. As noted above, ABA Model Rule 1.2 provides cover for this tendency. MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2010).
67. See Sandra Day O’Conner, Assoc. Justice, Sup. Ct. of the U.S., Professionalism, in
78 OR. L. REV. 385, 387 (1999). This tendency can be born of competitiveness, of the belief
that every client should seek the full vindication of her legal rights to the maximum extent
possible, or of a tendency to see the client as a metonym for a class of similarly situated
individuals.
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belief that doing so will best protect her. The client may also have difficulty
making choices – either failing to decide or vacillating. In an extreme
circumstance, the client may stake out a position based upon a false belief
which is not amenable to modification based upon contravening
information. Ms. X may believe that, if the guardianship petition is granted,
her brother will immediately have her committed “forever” – and may refuse
to believe the attorney’s explanations of the procedural safeguards designed
to prevent such an abuse. Any of these problems can result in a
representation where the client is unable or not permitted to exercise selfdetermination.

B.

Communication With the Client

The client cannot exercise her authority unless adequately informed.
The ABA has a Model Rule that deals with this issue, as well.68 In general
terms, it requires the attorney to keep the client abreast of the representation
so that she can make informed decisions.69 ABA Model Rule 1.4 provides
that the attorney shall keep the client informed of key facts and
developments in the representation, consult with the client on the means by
which objectives are pursued, comply with reasonable requests for
information, and “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.”70 The commentary sums up the purpose of this rule pithily:
“Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary
for the client effectively to participate in the representation.”71
Neither the commentary nor the rule, however, provides much guidance
as to what is “reasonable communication” or how much information is
“reasonably necessary” for the client to make an “informed decision.”72 The
answer cannot simply be to provide “all the information.” No attorney can
provide a client with every possible fact that could affect the client’s
decision. In addition, flooding a client with information that may not be
relevant to her decision does not facilitate autonomy – it may just paralyze
her decision-making process, making her more reliant on the attorney.
Happily, there is a well-developed body of case law in a highly analogous
area that provides some guidance.73
The doctrine of “informed consent” to medical procedures arose from
concerns similar to those which resulted in the client-centered lawyering

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2010).

See id.
Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 1 (2010).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 1-4 (2010).
See infra notes 74-79.
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model – the recognition of the right of patients to control what is done to
their bodies – and can be justified on similar normative (autonomy) and
practical (the need for them to be active partners in their own care for
effective results) grounds.74 In its modern formulation, the informed consent
doctrine generally requires that a physician disclose to a patient “what is
reasonably necessary for a reasonable person to make an intelligent
decision with respect to the choices of treatment or diagnosis.”75 The states
are split over whether the scope of disclosure is determined from the
physician’s76 or patient’s77 viewpoint, but disclosures normally must include
“the nature of the pertinent ailment or condition, the general nature of the
proposed treatment or procedure, the prospects of success, the risks of
failing to undergo any treatment or procedure at all, and the risks of any
alternate methods of treatment. A physician must also inform the patient of
any alternatives that exist to a surgical procedure.”78 The physician
generally need not disclose “alternative treatments or procedures which are
not accepted as feasible,”79 and “need not disclose absolutely every fact or
remote possibility that could theoretically accompany a procedure.”80

74. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the
Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 44-49 (1979-80). See also Stouffer v. Reid, 965
A.2d 96, 101 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (“The fountainhead of the doctrine . . . is the
patient’s right to exercise control over his own body . . . .”) (internal citations, quotations, and
alteration omitted).
75. Jandre v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 792 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
76. See, e.g., Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2010) (under Wyoming
law, “[a] physician is required to disclose only such risks that a reasonable practitioner of like
training would have disclosed in the same or similar circumstances.”) (internal citations,
quotations, and alteration omitted); Melton v. Medtronic, Inc., 698 S.E.2d 886, 894 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2010) (“The scope of a physician’s duty to disclose is measured by those
communications a reasonable medical practitioner in the same branch of medicine would
make under the same or similar circumstances.”) (internal citations, quotations, and alteration
omitted).
77. See, e.g., Wyszomierski v. Siracusa, 963 A.2d 943, 952 n.14 (Conn. 2009) (“The lay
standard requires a physician to provide the patient with the information which a reasonable
patient would have found material for making a decision whether to embark upon a
contemplated course of therapy.”) (internal citations, quotations, and alteration omitted); Univ.
of Md. Medical Sys. Corp. v. Waldt, 983 A.2d 112, 127 (Md. 2009) (“[T]he scope of the
physician’s duty to inform is to be measured by the materiality of the information to the
decision of the patient. A material risk is one which a physician knows or ought to know
would be significant to a reasonable person in the patient’s position.”) (internal citation,
quotation, and alteration omitted).
78. Pertuit v. Tenant Louisiana Health Systems, 49 So.3d 932, 936 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
79. Id. at 937.
80. Hageny v. Bodensteiner, 762 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (citation
omitted).
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However, the physician may be required to make more specific or detailed
disclosures if “the physician knows or should know of a patient’s unique
concern or lack of familiarity with medical procedures . . . .”81
These formulations provide a fair guide to attorneys. The attorney
should disclose to the client the basic nature of her matter and the general
legal standards governing it, the material facts about the representation, the
risks inherent in staking out contemplated positions and taking
contemplated tactical decisions, and the availability of alternatives to any of
these. The attorney need not disclose infeasible approaches (e.g., seeking a
declaration of unconstitutionality in a case where such a ruling is clearly
foreclosed). He should disclose particular facts or issues if he knows that
the client will be interested in them. For example, some clients may be
interested in asserting the unconstitutionality of a practice, even if such a
ruling is foreclosed, or may be particularly sensitive to anyone becoming
aware of their mental disability (e.g., someone who generally functions very
well and is aware of the negative social consequences which disclosure
might involve),82 and so may want to avoid any disclosure whatsoever, even
if it might benefit her in the representation. Ms. X’s experience of suffering
severe injuries due to poorly maintained facilities may have galvanized her
desire for justice, making her willing to stake out aggressive positions in the
interest of advancing the cause of those similarly situated to her. Or, her
sense of loss due to the explosion may drive her to reveal as little as possible
about her condition. Finally, though, the informed consent doctrine does
not answer the problem. It is a malpractice standard; beyond its limits, one
is open to civil suit. While malpractice is a concern for attorneys,83 we
should hold ourselves to a higher standard. The question should be not
simply, “What can I do without being sued?” but “What is the best action to
take within the range of permissible actions?”
In assessing the scope of disclosures to make, the attorney should also
be mindful of the impact of heuristic biases such as salience. Outlier
possibilities with severe negative impacts – such as death for one
considering undergoing a minor medical procedure, or imprisonment for
81. Hernandez ex rel. Telles-Hernandez v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1077
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
82. For a poignant description of a leading psychologist’s struggle with these issues in her
personal and professional life, see Benedict Carey, Expert of Mental Illness Reveals Her Own
Fight, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/health/23lives.html
83. Though we are unaware of any particular malpractice lawsuits in this context, it would
not be hard to imagine a disappointed client, or family member of a client, filing suit against
an attorney based on the attorney’s failure to prevent the client from making a clearly “bad”
decision when the attorney believed he was serving short-term autonomy, or failing to
zealously contest guardianship when the attorney believed he was protecting the client’s wellbeing.
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one facing a very minor criminal charge – become outsized possibilities in
the mind of the person faced with them, and can distort rational decisionmaking. Overwhelming the client with information that will frighten or upset
her to an extreme degree, although extremely unlikely to occur, does not
serve autonomy.84 The order in which information is presented (primacy
and recency) can also play a significant role in determining decisions, and
the attorney should be conscious of what he chooses to emphasize by
placing them first and last. For example, the attorney who believes that Ms.
X should be under some sort of supervision may find himself discussing the
benefits of the proposed guardianship first, then acknowledging the loss of
rights, and finally returning again to the benefits. If he does not reflect on
this inclination, the attorney risks unnecessarily supervening the client’s will.
Putting together the issues of informed consent, individuality, existence
of heuristics, and self-monitoring: The attorney needs to be aware, in the
process of communicating information, what he chooses to include and
what he chooses to exclude; needs to consider the manner and order in
which information is presented; and should remain mindful of the client’s
individual characteristics by including everything she would be interested in
knowing and being wary of how he addresses outlier possibilities that may
be especially alarming to the client. As in other facets of the representation,
there is no way to avoid attorney judgments in this regard. Self-monitoring
and consulting with other attorneys is the best way to ensure that the client
receives all the information she needs in a way that facilitates, rather than
guides or determines, her decisions.
In the representation of a client with limited competency, a number of
factors may complicate the execution of the duty of communication.85 The
attorney accustomed to quick interactions with clients may lack the patience
required to communicate with someone who has trouble understanding or
remembering key facts. Even a patient attorney may simply be too busy with
other matters to give the client the time she needs to understand case
developments. The communication strategies that the attorney usually
employs without reflection in other representations may not be effective.
The risk is that, out of a desire to reach the “best” result for the client, the
attorney may be over-selective in the information he provides. At the
opposite end of the spectrum, the attorney may overwhelm the client with

84. This is an area for the exercise of great caution. It can be difficult to distinguish
withholding information in service of long-term autonomy from doing so out of paternalism.
85. The commentary to Model Rule 1.4 notes this issue. “Ordinarily, the information to
be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult.
However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for
example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT 1.4 cmt. 6 (2010).
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too much information, or with information to which the client may be
extremely sensitive even if it is of little practical import.

C. Confidentiality of Client Information
The client cannot provide the attorney with all the material information
about a representation unless she can rest assured that the attorney will not
disclose the information to anyone unless it is required to achieve the goals
of the representation.86 This is of special concern where the information
might be embarrassing if brought to light, or might undermine the client’s
goals in the representation if revealed to the court or to any other party.
ABA Model Rule 1.6 bars disclosure of information relating to the
representation absent consent or exigency.87 The consent can be actual
“informed consent” or implied, as when the disclosure is “impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation.”88 The exigencies
include prevention of bodily or property harm and seeking ethical guidance
about the representation, among others.89
This is an area where any compromise must be very carefully
considered. The loss of trust that can result from inappropriate disclosure of
confidential information can be very detrimental to the representation, and
the sense of betrayal and exposure can be traumatic for the client. For
example, Ms. X has a history of paranoia and distrust of those close to her.
If she learns that her attorney has revealed information to her psychiatrist or
her brother without her consent, the representation may be irremediably
damaged. Workarounds are available to avoid disclosing client confidences
when the attorney needs to consult with someone outside the protection of
attorney-client privilege without seeking the client’s consent.90 The most
commonly employed workaround, and perhaps the most effective, is to
describe the client and her issue in sufficiently general terms to prevent
identification, but specific enough terms to permit comment on the client’s
situation.91

86. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010).
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010).
88. Id. The rule’s commentary offers as an example attorneys within a firm discussing a
case. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (2010).
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010).
90. Consultants and others retained to assist in a litigation are frequently covered by the
attorney-client privilege. Some courts recognize an even broader category of individuals to
whom information may be disclosed – those to whom disclosure was beneficial to the
representation and who could be expected to keep the information disclosed confidential.
91. This approach can be justified because it is not the pure disclosure of the facts of the
client’s situation that are harmful, but the disclosure of those facts in a way that would
associate them with the particular client.
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Issues of confidentiality are more likely to arise and more difficult to
navigate in the representation of a client with mental disability. The issues
are more likely to arise because the attorney may feel a greater need to
seek assistance from other attorneys, physicians, mental health experts, or
friends and family without formal client consent (e.g., in order to determine
whether the client is suffering from limited competency or to determine
appropriate techniques for working with a client who is). Confidentiality
issues are more difficult to navigate with mentally ill clients because the
disclosure can be extremely harmful to the client’s interests and to the
representation. For example, the attorney who consults with a physician
about the client’s competency without client consent risks making the
conversation available for discovery by other parties.92 The impact of such
a disclosure can range from embarrassment and adverse cross-examination
material in a matter where mental health is not the central concern, to
frustration of the very purpose of the representation in matters where mental
health is squarely at issue.
It is no surprise that this is the only area that the ABA Model Rule on
clients with diminished capacity treats explicitly. It states that client
information must still be kept confidential, even when the attorney is taking
protective action.93 Implied disclosure should not be interpreted as an
exception that swallows the rule. In particular, “the lawyer is impliedly
authorized . . . to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent
reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests.”94 This can make any
disclosure of the client’s condition forbidden in some circumstances. As the
commentary notes, “[d]isclosure of the client’s diminished capacity could
adversely affect the client’s interests. For example, raising the question of
diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for
involuntary commitment.”95
One example of when disclosure might be appropriate and permissible
is when a lawyer consults with a physician about a client who is having
difficulty communicating or making decisions about the representation. ABA
Informal Opinion 89-1530 permits such disclosures, even absent client
consent,96 so that the attorney may determine whether the client remains
capable of acting in her own best interest and may understand whether
92. If the attorney consults with a treating physician, the physician-patient privilege would
likely prevent the physician from testifying against the client in the guardianship proceeding if it
were a contested matter. See In re Guardian of Derek, 12 Misc. 3d 1132 (N.Y. Surr. Ct.
2006). Cf. In re Guardian of Linda Tian, 10/15/2007 N.Y.L.J. 30 (col. 4) (ordering release
of medical records in uncontested matter).
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(c) (2010).
94. Id.
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 8 (2010).
96. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1530 (1989).
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further protective action is necessary. For example, if Ms. X’s condition
deteriorates to the point of incoherence, the attorney may seek specific
advice from a physician in order to ensure that her health is not at
immediate risk and that she remains capable of making decisions.

D. Attorney Loyalty
Each client is entitled to the undivided loyalty of her attorney. This
means that, with respect to the representation, the attorney is beholden to
no one besides the client. ABA Model Rules 1.7 and 1.8 identify several
types of conflict of interest.97 We highlight two in particular for this article:
(1) unless the attorney gets the informed written consent of the client, she
must not take on a representation if doing so creates a “significant risk” that
the representation will be “materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities
to, [among others], a third person,”98 and (2) the attorney cannot be paid by
someone other than the client unless “the client gives informed consent;
there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and information relating to
representation of a client” is kept confidential.99
It is not reasonable to expect a client to repose trust in an attorney
unless she is confident that he is acting in accordance with her wishes. The
client with mental illness may already doubt the attorney’s loyalty. This risk
is exacerbated when the attorney is appointed by the court. The client may
wonder whether the attorney has been assigned in order to zealously
represent her, or instead to facilitate her processing through the legal
system. Ms. X already believes her APS-appointed psychiatrist is working
against her; she may expect the same of her court-appointed attorney.
Some of this is unjustified. An attorney who appears regularly in the probate
and mental health courts may have relationships with opposing counsel,
judges, and court personnel, and familiarity with the procedures employed
by courts or judges hearing mental disability matters that are constructive in
furthering the client’s goals. Appointed counsel who specialize in a
particular area often have specialized knowledge which can assist the client
in decision-making. But, some of this concern is rational: Both civil and
criminal appointed attorneys may be poorly paid, and their compensation is
often structured on a “per case” or “per motion” basis. There are thus
strong personal disincentives to thorough preparation, even for the
committed attorney. If the appointed attorney spends too much time on any
one case, he cannot tend to his other cases, and if he does not handle

97. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 1.7, 1.8 (2002).
98. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 1.7 (2002).
99. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 1.8(f) (2002).
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enough cases to make a living, then he will be forced to seek better-paying
work elsewhere, preventing him from taking on any appointed cases. There
are also institutional pressures: The attorney who depends on the goodwill
of others in the system (e.g., judges, state attorneys, or prosecutors) may pull
his punches, even unwittingly, in order to retain credibility for future
interactions (which he would put to use for his future clients). Judges want
cases resolved.
The stigma of mental disability, abetted by cultural myths and negative
media portrayals, creates additional problems. The client with some form of
mental disability or illness may have learned not to trust her own instincts,
and may tend to be overly reliant on the advice of others. “The client with
mental disabilities may be uniquely in need of skills and assertiveness
training to function as a participatory, and not nominal, client.”100
Conversely, the client may seek to maintain a sense of pride and dignity by
minimizing her difficulties in functioning, and so display confidence when
she is, in fact, confused. Ms. X might present such a scenario: She worked
her way into a supervisory position and put herself through night school to
earn a college degree, and so is likely possessed of a strong will and sense
of personal accomplishment. Her fear of loss of control over her life might
trump any worries she has for her health – remember that she began to
isolate herself more when she developed involuntary twitches from her
medication. An additional problem is that the client may project the stigma
she feels as one diagnosed with mental illness onto her attorney. As we
have seen from our work in the criminal justice system, the client who has
been told she is worthless for much of her life may have trouble believing
that anyone competent would willingly take up her cause, and so may
distrust the appointed attorney’s motives or abilities. “It is almost a truism
that a criminal defendant would rather have the most inept private counsel
than the most skilled and capable public defender.”101
V. APPLICATION TO GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS

A. Context
Every state provides proceedings by which an adult may have her rights
to act on her behalf partially or totally placed in the hands of another, who
is charged with the responsibility to act as a guardian (or, in some states,
conservator) of that person’s best interests. This deprivation of legal capacity
to act and placement in the hands of another is “an extraordinary exercise
of governmental authority,” and a “broad and very restrictive form of

100. Herr, supra note 32, at 639.
101. People v. Huffman, 139 Cal. Rptr. 264, 267 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
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substitute decision making . . . .”102 The need for a guardian does not grow
out of a specific (or indeed any) diagnosis, but rather out of functional
impairments which may be manifestations of an illness or condition at any
given point in time. Modern guardianship statutes recognize this and seek,
at least in principle, to minimize the intrusion by “afford[ing] the person the
greatest amount of independence and self-determination and participation
in all the decisions affecting such person’s life.”103
Accordingly, courts are directed to employ “the least restrictive form of
intervention” possible,104 meaning only granting the guardian “those powers
which are necessary to provide for that person’s personal needs and/or
property management and which are consistent with affording that person
the greatest amount of independence and self-determination in light of that
person’s understanding and appreciation of the nature and consequences
of his or her functional limitations.”105 Whether courts in fact do so,
because of the structure of the guardianship statutes106 or out of an
institutional tendency towards paternalism is another matter – as is whether
this failure makes court practices subject to challenge under the ADA.107
Finding the nexus between mental illness and lack of capacity can be tricky
and also may be contextually and temporally bound. Having first found lack
of capacity, many judges are reluctant to tie the hands of the guardian both
out of a sense of paternalism and to avoid the need for further
proceedings.108

B.

General Considerations

The attorney representing someone who is the subject of a guardianship
petition should employ the same least restrictive approach in her dealings
with her client. As the ABA has observed, “protective action should be

102. ROBERT D. FLEISCHNER, CTR. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION, GUARDIANSHIP, EXTRAORDINARY
TREATMENT AND SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT 1 (2000).
103. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2006). See also, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 1800 (West 2011) (expressing legislative intent, inter alia, to “increas[e] the conservatee’s
functional abilities to whatever extent possible” and “allow the conservatee to remain as
independent and in the least restrictive setting as possible”).
104. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.03(d).
105. Id. §§ 81.03(d), 81.02(a)(2). See also, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1800.
106. The finding of incapacity acts as an “on/off” switch triggering the loss of certain
rights. Only after this finding does the court consider whether any restrictions should be
placed on the guardianship. This finding may act as an anchor and may prompt judges to be
overrestrictive.
107. Salzman, supra note 2, at 173-82.
108. Henry A. Dlugacz, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment:
Some Thoughts on
Promoting a Meaningful Dialogue Between Mental Health Advocates and Lawmakers, 53
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 79, 89 (2008-09).
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exercised with caution in a limited manner consistent with the nature of the
particular lawyer/client relationship and the client’s needs . . . .”109 This
means that, in the particular context of guardianship proceedings, the
attorney must be very cautious about taking any action that would reveal to
the party petitioning for guardianship, the court, or anyone else not
protected by attorney-client privilege the attorney’s concerns about client
competence. “Incapacity,” i.e., that “the person is unable to provide for
personal needs and/or property management” and “cannot adequately
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of such inability” is
the very thing that the petitioner is seeking to establish. Effectively
conceding the issue would result in serious long-term deprivations of client
autonomy (i.e., by appointment of a guardian).110
The guardianship attorney must take a nuanced view of how to promote
self-determination. One option would be to focus on the immediate result,
and always advocate for the least intrusion on the client’s short-term
autonomy. However, where the client is not presently equipped to exercise
her autonomy, this may be setting her up to fail. The client may find herself
the subject of a further petition, or may simply fail to provide for her own
needs. If Ms. X is left completely to her own devices, her physical and
mental condition may deteriorate to the point of dangerouness A short-term
intervention (such as treatment, supported decision-making, or negotiating a
resolution involving a guardian with power limited in scope, duration, or
both) may promote her long-term autonomy by restoring her to competence
or providing her with the resources she needs to move towards greater
independence.
Many questions are raised in such circumstances. Is it ethical to pursue
such a course? How is the right to self-determination vindicated in the
extreme case where the client may be responding to hallucinations? Should
Ms. X’s attorney vigorously contest the petition and oppose any involvement
by her psychiatrist or brother, despite clear evidence that she suffers greatly
in the absence of treatment and indications that her brother has her best
interests at heart? Is doing what the client wishes at that point promoting
self-determination in the highest tradition of putting aside one’s
preconceived notions, or does simply following the client’s direction in such
circumstances make a farce of that ethical precept? Is helping her avoid a
guardianship in the moment the best way to promote self-determination
when long-term functioning will decline without intervention, leading to
more restrictive interventions such as involuntary civil commitment?

109. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996).
110. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02 (McKinney 2006).
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While states have developed different approaches, a goal of modern
guardianship statutes is “preserving the autonomy of [alleged incapacitated
persons] to the extent possible while providing necessary support for matters
One specific
beyond the [incapacitated person’s] competency.”111
manifestation of this least intrusive alternative approach is the imperative to
consider the sufficiency of community resources which might obviate the
need for a guardian.112 What is the lawyer’s duty to attempt to secure those
resources – e.g., a case manager, housing, psychiatric treatment – which
would make a guardian unneeded?
Is it permissible to breach
confidentiality on the basis of client need without making a simultaneous
effort to assist with procuring needed services? To repeat, these questions
can only be answered in the individual case, not in the abstract. The next
section proposes some concrete approaches to these dilemmas.

C. Concrete Solutions
1. Involvement of Family or Friends
Clients with mental disabilities may rely to varying degrees on the
assistance of family and friends in their everyday lives. Consequently, the
client may want or expect them to be involved in her legal representation, as
well. Friends and family can be valuable resources to the attorney, but can
also present thorny ethical problems.
Family and friend involvement can be beneficial for a number of
reasons. They are most likely to know the client’s premorbid desires and
values. The client may trust family and friends, and prefer their involvement.
If the family and friends are trustworthy, this approach mimics the supported
decision-making model (discussed below) that can encourage client
participation and autonomy.113 Yet there are also risks to the duties of
confidentiality and client loyalty. “Even though a family may appear united
when initially meeting with the attorney, the possibilities of conflicts are
staggering.”114 Friends and family may have interests that diverge from the
client’s in subtle ways; if the client is the individual who is the subject of the

111. See also MICHAEL L. PERLIN, PAMELA R. CHAMPINE, HENRY A. DLUGACZ & MARY CONNELL,
COMPETENCE IN THE LAW: FROM LEGAL THEORY TO CLINICAL APPLICATION 248 (2008), citing,
e.g., N.Y. M.H.L., at § 81.01.
112. See, e.g., N.Y. M.H.L.§81.02 (“In deciding whether the appointment is necessary, the
court shall consider the report of the court evaluator . . . and the sufficiency and reliability of
available resources . . . to provide for personal needs or property management without the
appointment of a guardian.”).
113. See infra Part D.1.
114. Barbara Carlin, Ethical Considerations and the Client with Diminished Capacity,
TOOLE, CARLIN & POWERS, P.A., at 1, 6, http://www.elderlawinme.com/ethical.pdf (last visited
June 10, 2011).
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guardianship petition (as opposed to the family members, who might also
seek representation in connection with the petition), it is critical to track
where direction is coming from and ensure that the family is assisting the
client in making decisions, not making decisions for her. Even if both Ms. X
and the attorney trust Ms. X’s brother, it is Ms. X who should be making
decisions about the representation to the greatest extent possible. This
approach may also create privilege problems, especially if the family
members’ or friends’ interests might later be found to diverge from that of
the client.
Frequently, the very people who bring the petition for
guardianship may be family or friends,115 or those who stand to benefit from
distributions of estate or trust property if the person is judged to be in need
of guardianship.116
Monetary issues rear their head particularly in this context. In one of the
author’s (HD) experience, guardianship may be employed with the poor,
because the alternatives that can prevent it – such as health care proxies,
powers of attorney, living wills – require access to legal counseling or
knowledge which may require the ability to pay attorney’s fees. Ms. X has
never put in place any of these protective measures, and her dwindling
resources may not be enough to cover the cost of them now. At the same
time, the wealthy may find themselves targets of a guardianship petition
when a family member or friend seeks to use the process as a means to
control the disposition of property prior to death and disposition by probate
or to preserve future inheritance—which is Ms. X’s fear.117
2. Appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem
In the hopes of getting clear direction and reducing the complexity of
the representation, the attorney confronted with a client with diminished
competency may wish to have a guardian ad litem appointed to make
decisions for the client. The Model Rules permit this approach.118
The fundamental benefit to this approach is that the attorney receives
clear direction from a person appointed by a court to so act, eliminating
questions about the attorney’s legal and ethical authority to carry out the
directions he is given. In the case of a severely incapacitated client, or one
who is extremely reliant on family members who may not have the client’s
best interests at heart, a guardian ad litem may protect the client from
advertent or inadvertent overreaching by family or friends, and can protect
the attorney from similar accusations. The cost to this approach is extremely
115. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.06 (McKinney 2006).
116. See, e.g., id.
117. Rein, supra note 2, at 243. See also PERLIN, CHAMPINE, DLUGACZ & CONNELL, supra
note 111.
118. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) (2010).
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high, however. It completely supplants client decision-making, and can be
alienating and traumatizing for the client, who may not trust the guardian ad
litem.119 Further, the attorney is not absolved of his responsibilities. He
cannot rely blindly on the guardian ad litem’s direction, but still must make
In the
“an independent determination of the client’s interests.”120
guardianship context, it is difficult to see how an attorney could carry out his
duties to the client and seek appointment of a guardian ad litem. If the
client’s disability is slight or moderate, the other accommodations and
support techniques discussed elsewhere here should suffice. If the client’s
disability is so severe as to make some form of guardianship a forgone
conclusion, cooperative participation from those involved in the client’s life
is probably the appropriate approach, and the appointment of a guardian
ad litem would only seem to add an unnecessary, uninformed party to the
mix.
3. Following the Client’s Directions Literally
One option available to the attorney who suspects the client may have
diminished competency would be to follow the client’s directions literally and
unquestioningly. From one perspective, this seems to serve autonomy by
eliminating the risk of the attorney overbearing the client’s will. Indeed,
some have contended that “[d]irect representation of the client’s expressed
wishes is clearly the optimal approach from ethical and pragmatic
perspectives.”121
We would question that approach, even for fully competent clients, for
reasons outlined in Section II above. The attorney cannot know whether the
client is making an informed decision until he has tested the client’s decision
against her stated values and rationales. The client is entitled to the benefit
of the attorney’s opinion, and is not well served unless she receives it.
In the guardianship context, this may manifest in the client who indicates
she wishes to resist the petition. Even though this direction may accord with
the attorney’s own views – he may have difficulty imagining being under
anyone’s guardianship, as well – he should engage in a firm and clear
exploration of the client’s wishes. The client may not understand the many
nuanced outcomes that may be available to her, including a guardianship
limited in scope or duration. It is as disparaging of individual choice to
assume that all clients wish to engage in adversarial proceedings as it is to
assume that all clients with a mental disability lack decisional capacity. It
may be perfectly rational to be relieved at the prospect of having assistance
119. Rein, supra note 2, at 245.
120. Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of Representation in
Children’s Class Action Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1446 (1996).
121. Herr, supra note 32, at 641.
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with the daily struggles of life. Do not many of us want to give up this
responsibility? It is likewise perfectly human to deny, particularly to a
stranger, that assistance is required. Further, it can be tremendously
stressful and destructive to litigate these proceedings, and a client who
initially indicates her desire to resist the petition may not wish to pursue
aggressive litigation once she understands what is involved.
It is
paternalistic to attempt to force a person to pursue all of their “rights,”
whether it is driven by cause-oriented lawyering or a failure to explore with
the client her options and the basis for her stated preferences.
In failing to explore all possibilities, including settlement of the
proceeding with appointment of a guardian, the attorney would be acting as
an advocate for the client’s presently stated interests – which benefits shortterm autonomy – but with possibly poor outcomes for the client in the long
run. Some states endorse this “advocate” role explicitly by requiring
attorneys to pursue a client’s opposition to the provision of mental health
services whenever the client expresses opposition to them.122 These states
do not appear to take into consideration the possibility that the client’s
presently expressed desires may not reflect her considered opinion, and may
undermine her long-term prospects of independence. Further, while we
strongly support the overriding value of self-determination, there are real-life
circumstances where blindly following the client’s wishes without critical
exploration, or permitting the client to express herself in court on the record,
can lead to almost farcical situations where the client becomes the subject
of demeaning ridicule in a public forum. Ms. X’s desire for independence
and dignity may not be advanced by allowing her to testify at length about
the people tapping her phone and the scheming of her brother and
psychiatrist. We offer no bright line rule for handling these situations but
suggest that just as the lawyer’s proper role as advocate should be
tempered by some humility and self-exploration, the right to selfdetermination should not prevent the attorney from attempting to aid the
client in preserving dignity. In all instances, the client has the right to our
clearly articulated opinion regarding the likelihood of success and the
consequences of certain actions.

122. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.004 (Vernon 2009) (“[r]egardless
of an attorney’s personal opinion, the attorney shall use all reasonable efforts within the
bounds of law to advocate the proposed patient’s right to avoid court-ordered mental health
services if the proposed patient expresses a desire to avoid the services”); In re Mental Health
of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 500 (Mont. 2001) (“the proper role of the attorney is to ‘represent
the perspective of the respondent and to serve as a vigorous advocate for the respondent’s
wishes’”) (quoting NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR INVOLUNTARY CIVIL
COMMITMENT, 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 410, 465 (1986)).
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4. Accommodations in Court Proceedings
Contested proceedings can be very stressful, because the client may
already be uncomfortable in the foreign environment, and because the need
to testify can be destructive to the client’s family and professional
relationships. Assuming the client is able to understand the risks involved,
the attorney should not seek to avoid such proceedings if the client has
given her informed consent. Instead, when indicated, he may consider
seeking accommodations within the proceeding. Frequent breaks or
transitional objects123 may help keep the client comfortable and engaged.
Adjournments to seek support and treatment might obviate the need for
guardianship, or at least improve the client’s ability to meaningfully
participate in the proceeding. However, in the guardianship context,
seeking these accommodations tacitly concedes that the person may not be
competent. This area is fraught with complexities and no categorical
solution applies. In practical terms, however, an attorney can work on these
issues with the client – to identify what accommodations may be needed, or
find some way to provide them sub rosa – before bringing them to the
attention of the court.
5. Withdrawal
A final option is for the attorney to withdraw from the representation.
Given the difficulty of navigating the demands of autonomy for a client with
diminished competency, withdrawal may be appealing to some. (One
hopes that the attorney who agrees to represent the subject of a
guardianship petition is already prepared for these sorts of dilemmas,
however.) The benefit to withdrawing is that it eliminates the dilemma for
the attorney. It is certain that he will not supplant the client’s decisionmaking authority.124 That is the only benefit. Withdrawal does not solve the
underlying dilemma for the next attorney, and can be extremely prejudicial
for the client. It “only solves the lawyer’s problem and may belittle the
client’s interest.”125 It often signals to the court and opposition that
something is wrong. The ABA discourages withdrawal,126 noting that it may
be impossible to withdraw without prejudicing the client’s interests,
particularly where the client’s disability has worsened over the course of the
representation, making it more difficult for any new counsel to serve the

123. A transitional object is a possession that carries special meaning for the individual,
and can provide a source of comfort in unfamiliar surroundings.
124. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996).
125. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996) (quoting
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 162 (1986)).
126. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996).
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client effectively.127 We do not regard withdrawal as a genuine option in the
guardianship context, except in the most extreme circumstances, but include
it for the sake of discussion.

D. Possible Alternatives to Guardianship
There are a number of alternatives to guardianship of which an attorney
practicing in this context should be aware. Some require advance planning,
while others can be brought into play after a guardianship petition has been
filed as a means to effectuate legislative intent to employ the least restrictive
means possible in ensuring that the basic needs of individuals with mental
disability are met.
1. Supported Decision-making
Supported decision-making occurs when an individual “receives support
from a trusted individual, network of individuals, or entity to make personal,
financial, and legal decisions that must be followed by third parties . . . .”128
It differs from substituted decision-making (such as occurs in guardianship
or when an attorney acts contrary to her client’s stated preferences) in that
the person receives help in understanding her choices and articulating them,
but final authority over the decisions rests with her. This can ameliorate the
downward spiral in functioning which can flow from a determination of
incapacity – once you are thought of as incapacitated, your opinion is not
sought, you lose the decision-making skills you have, and you become
dependent on others. “[P]erceived loss of control causes people to suffer
mental and physical decline.”129 Access to supported decision-making is
now the preferred norm by international treaty. The Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), to which the United States is a
signatory but which it has yet to ratify, requires states to “take appropriate
measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they
may require in exercising their legal capacity.”130 Other nations have begun
to provide for supported decision-making by statute or practice.131 In the
guardianship context, it is worth noting the point made by Surrogate Booth
in a New York guardianship matter: Although the United States has not
ratified the CRPD, “a state’s obligations under it are controlled by the

127. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996).
128. Salzman, supra note 2, at 180.
129. Rein, supra note 2, at 243.
130. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature Mar. 30,
2007, G.A. Res. 61/106, art.12(3), U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106, (Dec. 6, 2006). See also
Salzman, supra note 2, at 231-32.
131. Doug Surtees, The Evolution of Co-Decision-Making in Saskatchewan, 73 SASK. L.
REV. 75, 83-84 (2010).
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Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties[,] which requires signatories ‘to
refrain from acts which would defeat [the Disability Convention’s] object
and purpose.’”132
2. Enhanced Community Services That Could Obviate the Need for
Guardianship
While the manifestations of a mental disability may wax and wane,133
leading to the oft-described “lucid intervals,”134 a growing body of literature
describes evidence-based practices which can lead to recovery from, or
prolonged periods of remission from, serious mental illnesses.135 As noted,
the modern trend in guardianship law is towards a functional approach that
examines the alleged incapacitated person’s ability to handle the activities of
daily living without any diagnostic predicate.136 In contrast, earlier statutes
required a certain “status” such as diagnosis of dementia or mental illness
as a predicate for guardianship.137 Some statutes combine elements of both

132. In re SCPA Article 17-A Guardianship Proceeding for Mark C.H., Ward, 906
N.Y.S.2d 419, 433 (Sur. 2010) (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatises art. 18,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331).
133. Another issue to consider is the extent to which symptoms and their attendant
reductions in social functioning are iatrogenic – that is, caused by medications or
combinations of medications – and thus subject to reversal. See EDMUND H. DUTHIE, JR. &
PAUL R. KATZ, PRACTICE OF GERIATRICS 65-6 (3rd ed. 1998) (1986) (defining iatrogenic illness
as “any illness that results from a diagnostic procedure or therapeutic intervention or any
harmful occurrence that is not a natural consequence of the patient’s underlying illness”). The
same is true of disturbances in mental status caused by treatable medical conditions. While it
may seem obvious, it bears emphasis that mental illness is not protective of medical illness;
quite the contrary, people with severe mental illnesses have elevated rates of many major
medical conditions. See generally Marc De Hert et al., Physical Illness in Patients with Severe
Mental Disorders. I. Prevalence, Impact of Medications and Disparities in Health Care,
10 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 52, 52-53 (2011). That is to say, these areas of inquiry are not
categorical, but rather form the component parts of a full bio-psycho-social-legal assessment
of the situation.
134. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1033 (9th ed. 2009).
135. See, e.g., EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE (Robert E. Drake &
Howard H. Goldman eds., 2003) (noting the collection of articles on evidence-based research
within this book).
136. PERLIN, CHAMPINE, DLUGACZ & CONNELL, supra note 111, at 249-50. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 744.102(12) (2010).
137. PERLIN , CHAMPINE, DLUGACZ & CONNELL, supra note 111, at 249-50. See, e.g.,
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 1-201(7) (1982, amended 1997), 8A
U.L.A. 429 (2003).
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approaches,138 both of which have been criticized as having arbitrary
elements.139
To the extent a jurisdiction errs toward a functional threshold, supports
and treatment for people with severe mental illnesses may avoid or limit the
unwanted intrusion on their autonomy that guardianship signifies. Each
situation and individual are different, but, aside from the efficacy of properly
prescribed and monitored medications, there are five widely accepted
evidence-based practices that have been found effective in the treatment of
severe mental illness.140 First, assertive community treatment provides a
multi-disciplinary approach to care, where teams with very low caseloads
(10:1 ratio) provide 24-hour-a-day access to crises care and other forms of
treatment.141 Services are provided in vivo, or where the person resides,
rather than requiring the person to attend appointments in a clinic or
hospital.142 Second, family psychoeducation provides education for family
members and others providing support for consumers of mental health
services.143 It encourages collaboration between family, the person with a
mental disability, and clinicians to improve outcomes and has been shown
to enhance the quality of life for participants.144 Third, illness management
and recovery centers on the person with a mental disability taking
responsibility for her own life and fosters collaboration between caregiver
and participants.145 Fourth, where applicable, integrated dual diagnosis
treatment for those with substance abuse difficulties as well as mental illness
emphasizes motivational interventions and cognitive-behavioral treatments,
provided in an integrated manner rather than treating the two issues
separately.146 Finally, supported employment, where vocational services are

138. PERLIN, CHAMPINE, DLUGACZ & CONNELL, supra note 111, at 251.
139. Id. at 250. The status approach relies heavily on the vagaries of psychiatric
diagnosis, while the functional approach does not distinguish between illness and eccentricity.
Id. at 249-50.
140. Robert E. Drake et al., Implementing Evidence-Based Practices in Routine Mental
Health Service Settings, in EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 136,
at 1.
141. Susan D. Phillips et al., Moving Assertive Community Treatment into Standard
Practice, in EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 135, at 47, 48.
142. Id.
143. Lisa Dixon et al., Evidence-Based Practices for Services to Families of People With
Psychiatric Disabilities, in EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 135,
at 57, 58.
144. Id.
145. Frederick J. Frese III et al., Integrating Evidence-Based Practices and the Recovery
Model, in EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 135, at 21, 22.
146. Robert E. Drake et al., Implementing Dual Diagnosis Services for Clients With Severe
Mental Illness, in EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 135, at 39,
39-41.
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integrated with mental health treatment, has been found to be successful in
leading to competitive employment.147
3. Legal Planning That Can Obviate the Need for Guardianship
Anyone with sufficient foresight, means, and mental capacity can greatly
reduce the likelihood that she will require a guardian.148 The execution of a
durable power of attorney or irrevocable trust while the person is competent
are two ways people with access to legal advice make prior arrangements
so that they (or a proxy of their choosing) can continue to enter into
financial arrangements before they become incompetent.149 Likewise,
execution of a health care proxy or living will (in jurisdictions where they are
given force of law) may permit a person to avoid the expense and
humiliation of a guardianship proceeding with respect to personal decisionmaking.150 Had Ms. X established any of these protections when she was
first injured, she could have set boundaries on the type of assistance she
wanted from others, avoided invasive questioning from APS and the court
about her mental state, and ensured that her financial resources were
managed by someone trustworthy. There is an emphasis on the need for
advance planning, which in part is reliant on access to legal advice.
VI. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. Attorney Competence
Representation of persons with mental disabilities is routinely not of the
highest caliber.151
Attorneys may lack the expertise necessary to
competently handle the delicate issues raised by mental disabilities.152 The
limitations of time and expense imposed on appointed attorneys may be
crippling.153 Whether owing to personal discomfort, ingrained prejudices,
or a lack of expertise, judges sometimes fail to hold counsel to the highest
standards of the profession in proceedings involving mental disability

147. Gary R. Bond et al., Implementing Supported Employment as an Evidence-Based
Practice, in EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 135, at 29, 29.
148. PERLIN, CHAMPINE, DLUGACZ & CONNELL, supra note 111, at 245.
149. Id. at 245-46.
150. Id. at 245.
151. Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in
Mental Disability Cases, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 43-45 (1992).
152. See, e.g., In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 492 (Mont. 2001)
(“‘[R]easonable professional assistance’ cannot be presumed in a proceeding that routinely
accepts – and even requires – an unreasonably low standard of legal assistance and generally
disdains zealous, adversarial confrontation.”).
153. Id. (noting that in “an involuntary commitment proceeding . . . counsel typically has
less than 24 hours to prepare for a hearing on a State petition . . . .”).
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issues.154 Because one plays to the level of one’s competition, this may
result in sloppy lawyering, with insufficient attention to the applicable legal
standards or the client’s goals.
An attorney has an obligation to provide competent representation to
her client.155 Since most attorneys do not have experience dealing with
clients with mental disabilities and are not trained as mental health
professionals, they are often ill-equipped to accurately identify or develop
responses to a client’s disability. Reading a few articles on mental disability
and ethics will not prepare the attorney to deal with the complexities of a
client manifesting symptoms of a disability. Yet such judgments are
unavoidable. An attorney confronted with a client of questionable capacity
is already making a determination of that client’s capacity, even if only
preliminarily and for the purpose of determining whether intervention or
additional guidance from others is warranted.156 To comply with his ethical
obligations, an attorney who is likely to come into contact with clients with
limited competency must make efforts to educate himself about the
symptoms of mental disability and illness so that he can recognize them.157
In the event of a client showing significant symptoms, he should either seek
guidance from an attorney experienced with such clients, or support from a
medical professional, support network, or similar organization with the
appropriate background.
Beyond the question of assessment, the attorney must also ensure that
he is equipped to understand the substantive mental health issues at play.
He must be able to analyze medical records and effectively interview and
question physicians and mental health professionals.158 He must also
understand the “range of alternative, less-restrictive treatment and care
options available . . . .” in the client’s community.159
Specialized interview skills may also be required.160 People with mental
disabilities may have difficulty presenting material in a linear fashion. It is
important to use the right mixture of open-ended questions to allow the
person time to tell her story (narrative truth) in her own way, but move to
closed-ended (yes or no) questions when preparing for trial or to get very
154. Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 2, at 669-71.
155. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2011); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1980).
156. A.B.A. COMM’N ON L. & AGING & AMER. PSYCH. ASS’N, ASSESSMENT OF OLDER ADULTS
WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 1 (2005) [hereinafter DIMINISHED
CAPACITY HANDBOOK].
157. Id. at 8. Such clients are likely to be encountered in criminal defense, poverty law,
probate, and, of course, guardianship practices.
158. Perlin, Sanism, supra note 65, at 702-03.
159. In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 498 (Mont. 2001).
160. Perlin, Sanism, supra note 65, at 703.
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specific required information. Though it may be particularly tempting (and
sometimes necessary)161 to try to correct factual misunderstandings, this may
result in the attorney arguing with the client – which is disruptive to the
relationship. It may be impossible to convince Ms. X that her phone was
never tapped and that her psychiatrist and brother are not conspiring
against her, and efforts to convince her otherwise may lead her to a rupture
in the attorney-client relationship. It is important to recall that much of what
we think of as objective truth is really subjective. For example, the
temperature in a room may be viewed as an empirical inquiry, but whether it
feels hot or cold is not. Whether Ms. X’s apartment has stacks of
newspapers in it is empirical, but whether these stacks suggest mental illness
or just an individual taste is not. Recalling this simple example can help the
attorney avoid getting involved in counter-productive arguments with the
client. Looking for themes in the client’s communications and listening to
her sufficiently to understand the nuances of what she wants with regard to
the proceeding can be a sophisticated undertaking, but both good
lawyering and truly ethical practice may require just such an endeavor. The
Honorable Jack B. Weinstein once said, “We are responsible not only for
the rule of law. We are also accountable for the principle of empathy and
humanity.”162 In describing the fundamental difference between the
approach employed by social workers and that of the legal profession,
Judge Weinstein went on to say: “As I sometimes tell my law clerks, ‘As
judges, we must learn to be superficial.’ This fundamental difference
between the two professions may be summed up as ‘tell me more’ versus
‘get to the point.’”163

B.

Use of Experts

Experts may serve distinct purposes at different stages. An attorney
whose client seeks to avoid future challenges to advance directives and
financial planning methods, which may obviate the need for guardianship
later in life, may have a neutral expert evaluate and document the client’s
capacity at the time that the instruments are executed. At other times, an
expert may be employed following the filing of petition.
The attorney must be careful not to place complete reliance on a mental
health expert for several reasons. The attorney is ethically required to

161. An attorney should accept the client’s view to the extent possible. But, from time to
time, the attorney may be required to confront factual issues that may be bound up with poor
reality testing.
162. Jack B. Weinstein, When is a Social Worker as Well as a Lawyer Needed?, 2 J. INST.
STUD. LEG. ETH. 391, 391 (1999).
163. Id.
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exercise his own professional judgment.164 The legal standards for capacity
are not identical with those of the mental health professions,165 though they
are intertwined. Finally, mental health professions may have a bias towards
intervention and treatment – expertise seeks its own use.166

C. Danger of Outcome-Oriented Assessments
Implicit in our discussion of the need for self-evaluation, but still meriting
separate mention, is that the attorney must be careful not to make
judgments about whether the client is demonstrating competence based
primarily on whether the client’s decisions accord with his own. “[A] client’s
decision that accords with the professional’s judgment may be seen as a
well-considered decision.”167 As the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers has observed in the context of criminal defense, the
“ambiguous ethical norm related to an attorney’s obligation to facilitate
client participation and an attorney’s paternalistic attitude relevant to
decision making in cases involving defendants with mental health histories”
makes it “tempting for a defense lawyer to usurp a client’s authority,
especially if the client is difficult to work with, mentally ill, or lacks insight
into his mental illness.”168 The ABA made a similar observation in its formal
opinion on clients with disabilities. “A client who is making decisions that
the lawyer considers to be ill-considered is not necessarily unable to act in
his own interest, and the lawyer should not seek protective action merely to
protect the client from what the lawyer believes are errors in judgment.”169
The attorney must be certain, when evaluating his client’s competence, that
he is asking not whether the client is acting in a way that makes sense to the
attorney, but whether she is acting in a way that accords with her own
demonstrated premorbid preferences. The question must remain the same
even where the client’s decision accords with the attorney’s. For example,
the attorney who favors aggressive litigation may believe his client is acting
competently when she chooses a similar tack, even though she is, in fact,
simply relying on the attorney, or operating under a misconception about
what the consequences will be for her everyday life. “In other words, the
client’s capacity must be judged against the standard set by that person’s
own habitual or considered standards of behavior and values, rather than

164. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-2 (1980).
165. See DIMINISHED CAPACITY HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 5-12 (2005).
166. See Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 2, at 641-59.
167. Herr, supra note 32, at 621.
168. John M. Fabian, How to Deal With Difficult Clients from a Mental Health Perspective,
THE CHAMPION, June 2007, at 25, 27.
169. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996).
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against conventional standards held by others.”170 Ms. X may have made
an unusual set of choices about how to live her life, and those choices may
weigh on Ms. X’s physical health and finances, but the attorney cannot
assume that they are the product of mental illness simply because they
deviate widely from his own choices.
VII. CONCLUSION
The root principle is hard to take issue with: Humans are entitled to
autonomy, and those who have mental disabilities and need attorneys are
entitled to no less presumption of autonomy than anyone else. As we hope
this article has shown, however, putting this principle into practice in the
representation of a person who is the subject of a guardianship petition
forces the attorney to make difficult decisions that often compromise one or
another aspect of the client’s autonomy based on limited knowledge and
expertise. There is no avoiding these dilemmas, at least not as a society.
Whether any individual attorney chooses to participate or not, the
guardianship system will continue to process petitions, and individuals will
have significant decisions made about their capacity to act on their own
behalves. There are also no categorical solutions. The attorney who fights
a petition too ferociously may do as much harm as the attorney who raises
little defense at all. Each case demands that the attorney employ his skills to
communicate effectively, listen carefully, evaluate the client’s competency
based on his own experience and the resources available to him, and work
with the client to protect her long-term autonomy at minimal cost to her
short-term autonomy. We are hopeful that this article has provided some
context on these issues, some practical suggestions, and a framework for
debate in a frequently ignored area.

170. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996) (quoting
MICHEL SILBERFIELD & ARTHUR FISH, WHEN THE MIND FAILS: A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH
INCOMPETENCY 6 (1994)).
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